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Abstract—Two-factor authentication (2F) aims to enhance
resilience of password-based authentication by requiring users to
provide an additional authentication factor, e.g., a code generated
by a security token. However, it also introduces non-negligible
costs for service providers and requires users to carry out addi-
tional actions during the authentication process. In this paper, we
present an exploratory comparative study of the usability of 2F
technologies. First, we conduct a pre-study interview to identify
popular technologies as well as contexts and motivations in which
they are used. We then present the results of a quantitative study
based on a survey completed by 219 Mechanical Turk users,
aiming to measure the usability of three popular 2F solutions:
codes generated by security tokens, one-time PINs received via
email or SMS, and dedicated smartphone apps (e.g., Google
Authenticator). We record contexts and motivations, and study
their impact on perceived usability.
We find that 2F technologies are overall perceived as usable,
regardless of motivation and/or context of use. We also present
an exploratory factor analysis, highlighting that three metrics –
ease-of-use, required cognitive efforts, and trustworthiness – are
enough to capture key factors affecting 2F usability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite their well-known security issues, passwords are still
the most popular method of end-user authentication. Guessing
and offline dictionary attacks on user-generated passwords
are often possible due to their limited entropy. According to
Ashlee Vance [27], 20% of passwords are covered by a list of
only 5,000 passwords. Therefore, aiming to increase security,
complex password policies are often enforced, by requiring,
e.g., a minimum number of characters, inclusion of non alpha-
numeric symbols, or frequent password expiration. This often
creates an undesirable conflict between security and usability
– as highlighted in the context of password selection [11],
management [17, 31] and composition [19, 28] – and drives
users to find the easiest password that is policy-compliant [1].
Multi-factor authentication has emerged as an alternative
way to improve security by requiring the user to provide more
than one authentication factor, as opposed to only a password.
Authentication factors are usually of three kinds:
1) Knowledge – something the user knows, e.g., a password;
2) Possession – something the user has, e.g., a security token
(also known as hardware token);
3) Inherence – something the user is, e.g., a biometric
characteristic.
†Work done while authors were at PARC.
In this paper, we concentrate on the most common instanti-
ation of multi-factor authentication, i.e., the one based on two
factors, which we denote as 2F. Historically, 2F has been de-
ployed mostly in enterprise, government, and financial sectors,
where sensitivity of information and services has driven insti-
tutions to accept increased implementation/maintenance costs,
and/or to impose additional actions on authenticating users. In
2005, the United States’ Federal Financial Institutions Exami-
nation Council officially recommended the use of multi-factor
authentication [10], thus pressuring most institutions to adopt
some forms of 2F authentication for online banking. Similarly,
government agencies and enterprises often require employees
to use 2F for, e.g., VPN authentication or B2B transactions.
More recently, an increasing number of service providers, such
as Google, Facebook, Dropbox, Twitter, GitHub, have also
begun to provide their users with the option of enabling 2F,
arguably, motivated by the increasing number of password
databases hacked. Recent highly publicized incidents affected,
among others, Dropbox, Twitter, Linkedin, Rockyou.
Alas, security of 2F also suffers from a few limitations:
2F technologies, including recently proposed ones based on
fingerprints [25], are often vulnerable to man-in-the-middle,
forgery, or Trojan-based attacks, and are not completely effec-
tive against phishing [24]. Furthermore, 2F systems introduce
non-negligible costs for service providers and require users
to carry out additional actions in order to authenticate, e.g.,
entering a one-time code and/or carrying an additional device
with them. A common assumption in the IT sector, partially
supported by prior work [4–6, 13, 22, 26], is that 2F technolo-
gies have low(er) usability compared to authentication based
only on passwords, and this likely hinders larger adoption. In
fact, a few start-up companies (e.g., PassBan, Duo Security,
Authy, Encap) aim to innovate the 2F landscape by introducing
more usable solutions to the market. However, little research
actually studied the usability of different 2F technologies.
We begin to address this gap by presenting an exploratory
comparative usability study. First, we conduct a pre-study
interview, involving 9 participants, to identify popular 2F
technologies as well as the contexts and motivations in which
they are used. Then, we present the design and the results
of a quantitative study (based on a survey involving 219
Mechanical Turk users), that aims to measure the usability
of a few second-factor solutions: one-time codes generated by
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security tokens, one-time pins received via SMS or email, and
dedicated smartphone apps (such as, Google Authenticator).
Note that all our participants make use of 2F (i.e., had been
forced to or had chosen to), and thus might already have a
reasonable mental model of how 2F works.
Our comparative analysis of 2F usability yields some in-
teresting findings. We show how users’ perception of 2F
usability is often correlated with their individual characteristics
(such as, age, gender, background), rather than with the
actual technology or the context in which it is used. We find
that, overall, 2F technologies are perceived as highly usable,
with little difference among them, not even when they are
used for different motivations and different contexts. We also
present an exploratory factor analysis, which demonstrates
that three metrics – ease-of-use, required cognitive efforts, and
trustworthiness – are enough to capture key factors affecting
the usability of 2F technologies. Finally, we pave the way
for future qualitative studies, based on our factor analysis, to
further analyze our findings and confirm their generalizability.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review prior work on the usability of
single- and multi-factor authentication technologies.
A. Usability of Single Factor Technologies
Adams and Sasse [1] showed that, for users, security is not
a primary task, thus users feel under attack by “capricious”
password polices. Password policies often mandate the use of
long (and hard-to-remember) passwords, frequent password
changes, and using different passwords across different ser-
vices. This ultimately drives the user to find the simplest
password that barely complies with requirements [1]. Inglesant
and Sasse [15] analyzed “password diaries”, i.e., they asked
users to record the times they authenticated via passwords, and
found that frequent password changes are a burden, users do
not change passwords unless forced to, and that it is difficult
for them to create memorable, secure passwords adhering to
the policy. They also concluded that context of use has a
significant impact on the ability of users to become familiar
with complex passwords and, essentially, on their usability.
Bardram et al. [3] discussed burdens on nursing staff created
by hard-to-remember passwords in conjunction with frequent
logouts required by healthcare security standards, such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
The impact on usability and security of password composi-
tion policies has also been studied. For instance, Komanduri et
al. [19] showed that complex password policies can actually
decrease average password entropy, and that a 16-character
with no additional requirements provided the highest average
entropy per password. Egelman et al. [11] found that for
“important” accounts, a password meter (i.e., a visual clue
on password’s strength) successfully helps increase entropy.
Another line of work has focused on password managers.
Chiasson et al. [8] compared the usability of two password
managers (PwdHash and Password Multiplier), pointing to
a few usability issues in both implementations and showing
that users were often uncomfortable “relinquishing control” to
password managers. Karole et al. [17] studied the usability
of three password managers (LastPass, KeePassMobile, and
Roboform2Go), with a focus on mobile phone users. They
concluded that users preferred portable, stand-alone managers
over cloud-based ones, despite the better usability of the latter,
as they were not comfortable giving control of their passwords
to an online entity.
Finally, Bonneau et al. [5] evaluated, without conducting
any user study, authentication schemes including: plain pass-
words, OpenID [21], security tokens, phone-based tokens, etc.
They used a set of 25 subjective factors: 8 measuring usability,
6 measuring deployability, and 11 measuring security. Al-
though they did not conduct any user study, authors concluded
that: (i) no existing authentication scheme does best in all
metrics, and (ii) technologies that one could classify as 2F do
better than passwords in security but worse in usability.
Although not directly related to our 2F study, we will use
in our factor analysis some metrics introduced in the context
of password replacements [5] and password managers [17].
B. Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Technologies
Previous work has suggested that security via 2F decreases
usability of end-user authentication. For instance, Braz et
al. [6] showed that 2F increases “redundancy”, thus aug-
menting security but decreasing usability. Along similar lines,
Strouble et al. [26] analyzed the effects of implementing
2F on productivity, focusing on the “Common Access Card”
(CaC), a combined smart card/photo ID card used (at that
time) by US Department of Defense (DoD) employees. They
reported that users stopped checking emails at home (due to
the unavailability of card readers) and that many employees
accidentally left their card in the reader. Authors also estimated
that the DoD spent about $10.4M on time lost (e.g., when
employees left the base without their card and were unable to
re-enter) and concluded that the CaC increased security at the
expense of productivity.
Gunson et al. [13] focused on the usability of single and
two-factor authentication in automated telephone banking.
They presented a survey involving 62 users of telephone
banking, where participants were asked to rate their experience
using a proposed set of 22 usability-related questions. Accord-
ing to their analysis, 2F was perceived to be more secure, but
again less usable, than simple passwords and PINs.
Weir et al. [29] compared usability of push-button to-
kens, card activated tokens, and PIN activated tokens. They
measured usability in terms of efficiency (time needed for
authentication), as well as in terms of satisfaction, by asking
users to rate their experience using a set of 30 questions.
In addition to usability, they measured quality, convenience,
and security. They showed that users value convenience and
usability over security, and thus quality and usability are
sacrificed when increasing layers of security are required.
Somewhat closer to our work is another study by Weir et
al. [30], which analyzed the usability of passwords and two
methods of 2F: codes generated by token and PINs received
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via SMS. They performed a lab study where 141 participants
were asked to report on the usability of the three technologies
using 30 proposed questions. The authors concluded that
familiarity with a technology (rather than perceived usability)
impacted user willingness to use a given authentication tech-
nology. Their results showed that users perceived the 1-factor
method (with which the average user had most experience) as
being the most secure and most convenient option.
Our work differs from Weir et al. in several key aspects.
We compare a larger diversity of 2F technologies (security
tokens, codes received via SMS/email, and dedicated apps)
and do not study the trade-off between security and usability.
In constrast, we provide a comparative study among different
technologies, aiming to understand how each 2F technology
performs compared to others. Specifically, we study the rela-
tion between 2F technologies and the contexts in which they
are used, as well as the motivation driving the users to adopt
them, partially motivated by previous work by Goffman [12]
and Nissenbaum [20], who showed that human behavior often
significantly differs based on context. Finally, we consider
a larger pool of participants, measure an extensive list of
factors beyond Weir’s work, and conduct an exploratory factor
analysis to determine key factors that affect usability of 2F.
III. PRE-STUDY INTERVIEWS WITH 2F USERS
Our first step is to determine broad trends and attitudes of
2F users: we aim to obtain a a general understanding of 2F
technologies in use, the context in which these technologies
are deployed, and why they are adopted. To this end, we
interviewed 9 participants, and designed a larger quantitative
study (detailed in next section) based on them. Both user
studies were approved by PARC’s Institutional Review Board.
A. Methodology
We recruited participants by posting to local mailing lists
and social media (Google+ and Facebook), announcing paid
interviews for a user study on security and authentication
technologies. Interested users were invited to complete an
online screening survey to assess eligibility to participate. We
collected basic demographic information such as age, gender,
education level, familiarity with Computer Security, and asked
potential participants whether or not they had previously used
2F. Users without 2F familiarity were not invited to participate.
The screening survey was completed by 29 people, and
we selected 9 participants, most of them from the Silicon
Valley, with a wide range of ages (21 to 49), genders (5
men, 4 women), and educational background (ranging from
high school to Ph.D. degrees). 5/9 users reported having a
background in Computer Security.
We interviewed users in one-on-one meetings, either face
to face, or via Skype. Before each interview, users were given
a consent form, indicating the interview procedure and data
confidentiality. Each participant was compensated with a $10
Amazon Gift Card.
We started the interviews by reading from a list of 2F
technologies, asking participants if they had used them:
• PIN from a paper/card (one-time PIN)
• A digital certificate
• An RSA token code
• A Verisign token code
• A Paypal token code
• Google Authenticator
• A PIN received by SMS/email
• A USB token
• A smartcard
To assess users’ understanding and familiarity with 2F,
we let them provide a brief description of two-factor au-
thentication, and explain the difference with password-based
authentication. (Obviously, we did not provide users with a
2F definition prior to this question, nor mention that the study
was about 2F).
Then, we asked participants why they used 2F and why
they thought other people would; this helped us understand
the motivation and the context in which they used 2F. Users
were also asked to recall the last time they had used any 2F
technology and report any encountered issues and whether or
not they wanted to change the technology (and, if so, how).
If users had used multiple technologies, we also asked to
compare them, and this helped us understand how participants
use and perceive 2F technologies.
B. Findings
We found that most used 2F technologies included: codes
generated by a security token, received via SMS or email, and
codes generated by a dedicated smartphone app, entered along
with username and password.
Participants used 2F technology in three contexts: work
(e.g., to log into their company’s VPN), personal (e.g., to
protect a social networking account), or financial (e.g., to gain
access to online banking).
Study participants used 2F because they either were forced,
wanted to, or had an incentive. Most users adopted security
tokens because an employer or bank had forced them. Some
were unhappy about this: A participant mentioned 2F was not
“worth spending 5 minutes for $1.99 purchases”. Two partic-
ipants (customers of different banks) reported adopting 2F in
order to “obtain higher limits on online banking transactions.”
Other users used 2F to “avoid getting hacked.”
Some users of tokens complained that it was annoying
to have to remember to carry security tokens. One user
recommended to “store the token in the laptop bag” to
avoid this issue. Some users experienced delays from SMS-
based codes, and were “annoyed, especially when paying for
incoming texts.” One user pointed out that (s)he “preferred text
messages”, since (s)he “did not have a smartphone.” Others
preferred not to use security tokens as they “can be lost.”
Some participants preferred tokens as they are easier to use
compared to mobile applications, where one has to “look down
to unlock screen, find app, open app, and read the code.”
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IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 2F USERS’
PREFERENCES
Our second/main study consists of a quantitative analysis of
2F users’ preferences. Inspired by the results of our pre-study
interviews, we designed and conducted a survey involving 219
2F users, recruited on Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
A. Methodology
We initially recruited 268 U.S.-based MTurk users. All
MTurk users had to have a 95% or higher approval rating.
13 of them were not eligible as they had not used any 2F
technology. 36 users abandoned the survey prior to completion.
The remaining 219 MTurk users were asked to complete
an online survey about 2F technologies. Study participants
received $2.00 for no more than 30 minutes of survey taking.
On MTurk studies. Previous research showed that MTurk
users are a valid alternative to traditional human subject pools
in social sciences. For example, Jakobsson [16] compared
the results of a study conducted on MTurk with results
conducted by an independent survey company, and found that
both results were statistically indistinguishable. Furthermore,
MTurk users are often more diverse in terms of age, income,
education level, and geographic location than the traditional
pool for social science experiments [14]. However, research
has also highlighted that MTurkers are often younger and more
computer savvy [9]. As we will discuss in Sec. V, our work is
intended to serve as a preliminary study, which should guide
and inform the design of a qualitative study.
Data sanitization. Kittur et al. [18] point out that MTurk users
often try to cheat at tasks. Therefore, we designed the survey
to include several sanity-check questions, such as simple
math questions (in the form of Likert questions) in order to
verify that participants were paying attention (and were not
answering randomly). We also introduced some contrasting
Likert questions (e.g., “I enjoyed using the technology” and
“I did not enjoy using the technology”) and verified that
answers were consistent. Users who did not answer correctly
all sanity checks were to be discarded from the analysis (but
still compensated). Actually, all users answered the sanity-
checks correctly. Also note that analysis of the time spent by
each survey participant showed completion times in line with
those of test runs done by experimenters ( 15–30 minutes,
depending on number of 2F tech used).
Recruitment. We screened potential participants by asking
whether they had used 2F, and presented a list of examples:
security tokens, codes received via SMS/email, and dedicated
smartphone apps. Users who reported to have never used any
of these technologies were told that they were not eligible to
participate in our survey, and blocked from proceeding further
or going back to change their answer. Also note the MTurk
task announcement did not state that users were required to
have used 2F and merely presented it alongside other basic
demographics such as age and gender.
Gender
Male 61.6%
Female 38.4%
Age
18–24 22.4 %
25–34 48.4 %
35–44 17.8 %
45–54 5.4 %
55–65 5.4 %
65+ 0.5 %
Income
Less than $10,000 15.5 %
$10,000 – $20,00 14.6 %
$20,001 – $35,000 25.5%)
$35,001 – $50,000 18.3 %
$50,0001– $75,000 18.7 %
$75,001 – $90,000 3.6 %
$90,0001 – $120,000 2.7 %
$120,001 – $200,000 0.9 %
Education
Less than high school 0.46 %
Some college 32 %
Undergrad 37.4 %
Some grad school 3.1%
Master’s degree 5.9 %
PhD 0.9 %
Familiar with Computer Science?
Yes 22.8%
No 77.2%
Familiar with Computer Security?
Yes 5.4%
No 94.6%
TABLE I: Participants’ demographics (Total n = 219).
Demographics. The demographics of the 219 study partici-
pants are reported in Table I. Our population included 135
(61.6%) males and 84 females (38.4%). 50/219 (22.8%) users
reported a background in computer science, and 12/219 (5.4%)
users reported a background in computer security. Education
levels ranged from high school diploma to PhD degrees. Ages
ranged from 18 to 66, with an average age of 32 and a standard
deviation of 10.2.
B. Study Design
Technologies, Context, and Motivation. The first question in
the survey asked users if they had used any of the following
2F technologies (for each of them, we displayed an example
picture):
• Token: Standalone pieces of hardware which display a
code, Figure 1(a).
• Email/SMS: A code received via email or SMS (also
known as “text messages”), Figure 1(b).
• App: Codes delivered via an app running on a smartphone
or other portable electronic device, such as an iPad or
Android tablet, Figure 1(c).
Next, the survey branched depending on how many and
what technology/technologies had been selected. Specifically,
users were asked to answer the same set of questions for each
technology they had used.
One of our main objectives was to measure and compare in
which context and with what motivation users were exposed
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1: Examples of 2F technologies: (a) codes generated by a security token, (b) codes received via SMS, (c) codes generated by a dedicated
smartphone app.
to 2F technologies. Specifically, for each technology we asked
users in which of the following context(s) they used the
technology:
• Financial: While doing online banking or other financial
transactions (e.g., bill payment, checking credit card
balance, doing taxes).
• Work: While performing work duties (e.g. logging in
company VPN).
• Personal: While accessing a personal account not used for
work or finance (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Google, etc.).
• Other: Open-ended.
Also, we asked users why they had been using 2F. Possible
motivations included:
• Voluntary: The participant voluntarily adopted 2F .
• Incentive: The participant got an incentive to adopt
2F (e.g., extra privileges/functionality, such as increased
bank transfer limits).
• Forced: The participant had no choice (e.g., employer
policy forcing adoption).
• Other: Open-ended.
System Usability Score and Other Likert Questions. For
each employed 2F technology participants were asked to rank
the usability of the technology using 10 Likert questions from
the System Usability Scale (SUS) [7]. Previous research has
shown SUS is a fairly accurate measure of usability [2].
Note that, in order to be consistent with other Likert
questions in our survey, we modified the SUS questionnaire to
include a 7-point range, rather than the more common 5-point
range, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 7 being “Strongly
Agree”.
Next, for each employed 2F technology, participants, where
asked a series of 7-point Likert questions (with 1 being
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 being “Strongly Agree”) about the
following statements:
• Convenient: I thought (technology) was convenient.
• Quick: Using (technology) was quick.
• Enjoy: I enjoyed using (technology).
• Reuse: I would be happy to use (technology) again.
• Helpful: I found using (technology) helpful.
• No Enjoy: I did not enjoy using (technology).
• User Friendly: I found (technology) technology user
friendly.
Group 2F Technologies # of Participants
1 Token 11
2 Email/SMS 77
3 App 7
4 Token & Email/SMS 29
5 Token & App 3
6 Email/SMS & App 50
7 Token, Email/SMS & App 41
Total 219
TABLE II: Usage of 2F technologies among survey participants.
• Need Instructions: I needed instructions to use (technol-
ogy).
• Concentrate: I had to concentrate when using (technol-
ogy).
• Stressful: Using (technology) was stressful.
• Match: (technology) did not match my expectations re-
garding the steps I had to follow to use it.
• Frustrating: Using (technology) was frustrating.
• Trust: I found using (technology) trustworthy.
• Secure: How secure did you feel to authenticate using
(technology) instead of just username & password? (1:
“Not at All Secure” 7: “Very secure”)
• Easy: Knowing how to get the code from (technology)
was easy.
The above questions are inspired from metrics used in pre-
vious work [5, 17] and findings from our pre-study interviews.
They are meant to be extensive and measure factors beyond the
System Usability Score, such as trustworthiness, convenience,
ease of use, reuse, enjoyment, concentration, portability, etc.
C. Results
We first analyze how 2F technologies are used by in-
vestigating the relation between independent factors such as
context, motivation, technologies, and gender. We then provide
an exploratory factor analysis about users’ perception of 2F
technologies (Likert questions), aiming to understand which
factors are best to capture the usability of 2F. We then provide
a comparative analysis of the usability of 2F technologies
using those factors, and conclude with a discussion of our
findings and highlighting some issues with 2F.
Use of 2-Factor. Recall from our study design that participants
5
 Fig. 2: Distribution of the use of 2F technologies across contexts.
were asked to identify the different 2F technologies they use,
in which context, and why. Almost half of the participants
(43%) used only one technology, while 37% used two, and
20% three technologies. Table II summarizes the use of the
three 2F technologies among the 219 participants. We observe
that “Email/SMS” (i.e., one-time codes received via SMS or
email) is the most used technology as 89.95% (197/219) used
it as a second factor. Also, 45.20% (99/219) of participants
used “App” (i.e., codes generated by a dedicated smartphone
app, such as Google Authenticator). “Token” (i.e., codes
generated by a hardware/security token) is the least common
technology, only used by 24.20% (53/219). It is interesting to
observe that App, despite being the most recent technology,
has a higher adoption rate than Token, one of the oldest
technology. This evolution might be related with the fast-
increasing number of users owning smartphones, which can
serve as a second-factor device that is always with the user.
Different Technologies in Different Contexts. The three 2F
technologies are used differently depending on context (Fig-
ure 2). In the financial context, Email/SMS is the most popular
2F (69.42%), followed by App (20.39%) and Token (10.19%).
In the personal context, Email/SMS is also the most popular
(54.48%), followed by App (29.75%) and Token (15.77%).
In the work context, Token is the most popular (45.36%),
followed by Email/SMS (39.18%) and App (15.46%). A χ2-
test shows that differences are significant (χ2(4, N = 582) =
65.18, p < 0.0001). No participant reported using 2F in any
context other than work/financial/personal (participants could
do so via an open-ended question).
It is relatively unsurprising that Token is most popular in
the work context—an environment with high inertia—while
it is noticeable that many users adopt tokens in the personal
context. The analysis of open-ended questions seem to show
that online gaming is the main field of adoption for Token in
the personal context.
Different Motivations for Different Technologies. We find
that few participants are incentivized to use 2F – see Figure 3.
Only 19.73% of Token users, 11.65% of Email/SMS users
and 9.25% of App users are incentivized. Actually, 44.90% of
Token users were forced, while 53.18% of App were voluntary.
A χ2-test shows that differences are significant (χ2(4, N =
775) = 14.68, p < 0.001). No participant reported using
2F for any motivation other than forced/incentive/voluntary
 
Fig. 3: Distribution of the motivation across 2F technologies.
 
Fig. 4: Distribution of the motivation across contexts.
(participants could do so via an open-ended question).
Different Motivations in Different Contexts. We find that
in the work context, 60.84% of participants were forced to
use 2F, versus 27.97% of participants using 2F voluntarily.
In the personal context, more than half participants (51.26%)
use 2F voluntarily and 34.73% are forced to. In the financial
context, about 45.45% of participants use 2F voluntarily and
42.91% are forced to. Distributions are plotted in Figure 4.
A χ2-test shows that differences are significant (χ2(4, N =
775) = 29.76, p < 0.0001).
This result is expected, as users tend to be forced to use
2F at work, and tend to use it voluntarily (opt-in) for personal
use. In the financial context, the distribution is even.
Gender Differences. While there is no gender difference in
terms of adoption rate for Token and Email/SMS, male users
adopt App-based 2F more than female users – see Table III.
The χ2-test shows that the difference is significant (χ2(1, N =
219) = 29.76, p < 0.05).
2F for Online Gaming. As mentioned earlier, we also asked
participants to list services and websites for which they
used 2F. Surprisingly, we find that in the personal context,
in addition to personal email, document sharing, and social
networking sites, participants also used 2F for online gaming,
e.g., on Battle.net, Diablo 3, World of Warcraft, Blizzard
Entertainment, and swtor.com.
D. Exploratory Factor Analysis
While SUS is a generic usability measure, we argue that
2F technologies rely on a unique combination of hardware
and software that SUS may fail to capture. Following this
shortcoming, previous work [5, 6, 13, 17, 29, 30] considered
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Loadings
Factor 1: Ease of Use Factor 2: Cognitive Efforts Factor 3: Trust Communality
Convenient 0.91 0.05 -0.02 0.77
Quick 0.84 -0.12 -0.15 0.67
Enjoy 0.77 0.15 0.12 0.63
Reuse 0.75 0.04 0.19 0.75
Helpful 0.72 0.02 0.17 0.69
No Enjoy -0.52 0.22 -0.16 0.55
User Friendly 0.42 -0.19 0.37 0.74
Need Instructions 0.15 0.80 -0.12 0.60
Concentrate 0.03 0.64 0.14 0.38
Stressful -0.41 0.51 0.01 0.59
Match -0.30 0.42 -0.15 0.47
Frustrating -0.47 0.47 0.00 0.63
Trust 0.08 -0.04 0.80 0.74
Secure -0.02 0.03 0.82 0.82
Easy 0.27 -0.28 0.31 0.44
Eigenvalues 7.52 1.78 1.03
% of Variance 32 15 14
Total Variance 61%
TABLE IV: Factor Analysis Table.
Female Male
App Users 31 71
Non-App 53 64
TABLE III: Distribution of gender across 2F App technology.
a series of questions and parameters to evaluate the usability of
2F schemes. In order to obtain key elements central to the un-
derstanding of the usability of 2F, we perform an exploratory
factor analysis (see aforementioned 15 Likert questions).
We factor-analyze our questions using Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) with Varimax (orthogonal) rotation. Items
with loadings < 0.4 are excluded. The analysis yields three
factors explaining a total of 61% of the variance for the entire
set of variables. These factors are independent of each other
(i.e., they are not correlated).
Factor 1 is labeled Ease of Use (EaseUse for short) due
to the high loadings by following items: Quick, enjoy, user
friendly, convenient, easy reuse, helpful, and convenient. This
first factor explains 32% of the variance.
The second derived factor is labeled Cognitive Efforts (Cog-
Efforts for short). This factor is labeled as such due to the high
loadings by following factors: Frustrating, stressful, match,
need instructions, and concentration. The variance explained
by this factor is 15%.
The third derived factor is labeled Trustworthiness. This
factor is labeled as such due to the high loadings by following
factors: Secure and trust. The variance explained by this factor
is 14% (Table IV).
The commonalities of the variables included are rather low
overall, with one variable having a small amount of variance
(Concentrate, 38%) in common with the other variables in the
analysis. This may indicate that the variables chosen for this
analysis are only weakly related with each other. However,
Token Email/SMS App
SUS 5.88 5.82 5.79
EaseUse 5.37 5.4 5.51
CogEfforts 2.35 2.44 2.43
Trustworthiness 6.2 5.81 5.9
2.2D
3.2D
4.2D
5.2D
6.2D
SUSD EaseUseD CogEffortsD TrustworthinessD
TokenD Email/SMSD AppD
Fig. 5: Overview of usability measures of different 2F technologies.
The x-axis lists the different considered factors and the y-axis gives
the average score on the 7-point Likert scale.
the KMO test indicates that the set of variables are at least
adequately related for factor analysis.
In conclusion, we have identified three clear factors among
participants: ease of use, required cognitive efforts, and trust-
worthiness.
Overview of Usability Measures. In Figure 5, we show the
average usability measures for different 2F technologies. We
obtain similar ratings for different technologies. The average
SUS score is around 5.8, EaseUse is about 5.4, CogEfforts is
2.4, and Trustworthiness is around 6. We observe that SUS
is high for all 2F technologies: converting the SUS score to
a percentage scale, overall SUS is more than 80%, which
is considered “Grade A” usability [23]. In addition, SUS is
correlated with EaseUse (r = 0.8). Next, we look into factors
that influence 2F usability measures.
Comparison among Different 2F Technologies. We now
compare the usability of different 2F technologies, taking into
consideration the context in which they are used and the
characteristics of the individuals who used them, including
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age, gender and whether they have a computer science back-
ground (“CS Back”). Some participants only use one of the
2F technologies and others use more than one. To compare
the usability of different technologies, we split participants
into 7 subgroups (Table II) and performed analysis on each
of the subgroups. Since there are not enough participants
in Groups 1, 3, and 5 (Table II), these groups were not
analyzed. For usability measures, we use the three newly
discovered factors (introduced above): “EaseUse” (α = 0.92),
“CogEffort” (α = 0.74), and “Trustworthiness” (α = 0.81).
Email/SMS Users. 77 participants only use Email/SMS as
2F technology, with 13 of them having a CS background.
To compare the usability measures for participants who only
use Emails/SMS (Group 2), we ran a MANOVA with one
between factor computer science background (CS Back vs
non CS Back), and age, gender and context as covariates. The
dependent variables were the three usability measures. Using
Pillai’s trace, CS Back (V = 0.07, F (3, 124) = 3.04, p =
0.02) was a significant factor. Age, gender and context were
not significant.
We conduct further analysis to test the effects of computer
science background on the 3 usability dimensions using Mann-
Whitney U Test (i.e., Shapiro-Wilk test shows that our data
is not normally distributed). We used Bonferroni adjusted
alpha levels of 0.0167 per test (0.05/3). Results indicate that
participants without a computer science background (EaseUse
Md = 5.88) find Email/SMS to be easier to use than
participants with a computer science background (EaseUse
Md = 4.88, U = 1792, p = 0.001).
Token & Email/SMS Users. 29 participants used both token
and email/SMS 2F technologies, with 7 having a computer
science background. To compare the usability measures for
participants who use both Emails/SMS and app (Group 4),
we ran a one way (Technology: Token vs. Email/SMS) within
subject MANOVA, with age, gender and context as covariates.
The CS Back was not included in the analysis because there
were not enough participants with CS Back. No main effect of
technology was found. Age was a significant covariate (V =
0.13, F (3, 63) = 3.12, p = 0.03).
Similarly, we test the effects of age on the 3 usability di-
mensions using Mann-Whitney U Test and Bonferroni adjusted
alpha levels of 0.0167 per test (0.05/3). Results show that
elder people in Group 4 (age above median age of 33;N = 12,
cogEfforts Md = 3) need more cognitive efforts to use
2F technology than younger people (N = 17, CogEfforts
Md = 2, U = 873, p = 0.003).
Email/SMS & App Users. 50 participants used both
Email/SMS and App (Group 6), with only 5 having a computer
science background. To compare the usability measures for
participants who use both Emails/SMS and app (Group 6),
we ran a one way (Technology: Email/SMS vs. App) within
subject MANOVA, with age, gender and context as covariates.
The CS Back was not included in the MANOVA because there
were not enough participants. Similar to results in Group 4,
no main effect of technology was found. Age was a significant
covariate (V = 0.13, F (3, 63) = 3.12, p = 0.03).
Similarly, we test the effects of age on the 3 usability
dimensions using Mann-Whitney U Test and Bonferroni ad-
justed alpha levels of 0.0167 per test (0.05/3). Results show
that elder people find 2F technology less trustworthy (Trust-
worthiness Md = 5.5) than younger people (Trustworthiness
Md = 6.0, U = 2755, p = 0.007).
Token, Email/SMS & App Users. 41 participants used all
token, email/SMS and App, with 17 having a CS background.
To compare the usability measures for participants in this
group, we ran a 3(Technology: Token, Email/SMS vs. App)
x 2(CS Back vs non CS Back) MANOVA, with Technology
as a within subject variable and CS Back as a between
subject variable, and age, gender and context as covariates.
Technology and CS back were not significant. Gender is a
significant factor (V = 0.12, F (3, 168) = 7.44, p = 0.0001).
Similarly, we test the effects of gender on the 3 usability
dimensions using Mann-Whitney U Test and Bonferroni ad-
justed alpha levels of 0.0167 per test (0.05/3). Female users
(CogEfforts Md = 2.75, N = 12) need more cognitive efforts
than male users (CogEfforts Md = 2.00, U = 4124, p =
0.001, N = 29).
E. Analysis of Open-Ended Questions
For each 2F technology, we asked users to answer a few
open-ended questions about the services/websites where the
used 2F and they issues they encountered. As mentioned
earlier, security tokens tend to be used for work, finance, and
personal websites. Interestingly, users often rely on tokens
to protect their online gaming accounts: the fear of losing
their gaming profile is high enough for users to adopt 2F.
Users complain that the authentication process is often prone
to failure (“The authentication to the server was down.”), is
time sensitive (“Sometimes, during the code rollover, you’d
end up with a mismatch and have to start the whole process
over”), and that problem resolution is complicated (“If I made
three mistakes entering my code, I had to call the state help
desk to have my PIN reset”).
Email/SMS have, overall, a high variety of use cases, but
were frequently used with banks as well as with Facebook,
Google, and Paypal. People complained about specific issues
with codes expiring or failing to be received, especially while
traveling abroad. For instance, a number of users complain
about SMS not working abroad (“Sometimes it wouldn’t
send”, “My husband changed his phone number when mov-
ing to the US and had a lot of problems getting things.”,
“Sometimes I am unable to receive a code if I am overseas.
In that case, I have to call a toll free number or e-mail
customer support to receive the code via e-mail instead of
text.”), and again regarding the difficult problem resolution
(“The passcode they sent me didn’t work and I had to call
them to get a new one. It was very frustrating.”).
Finally, we noticed that enterprises rely on (mostly pro-
prietary) security tokens (e.g., RSA/Verisign tokens) for au-
thentication to corporate networks in the workplace. Also,
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smartphone apps (e.g., Google Authenticator) are mostly used
by customers who opt-in to 2F with online services providers,
such as, Google, Dropbox, or Facebook.
V. DISCUSSION
We now discuss findings drawn by our exploratory study,
and highlight items for future work.
Adoption. 2F technologies are adopted at different rates, de-
pending on contexts and motivations. Specifically, in the work
environment, codes generated by security tokens constitute the
most used second factor of authentication. Codes received via
email or SMS are most popular in the financial and personal
contexts. Also, few users receive incentives to adopt 2F, while
many utilize security tokens because they are forced to, or
decide to opt-in to use dedicated smartphone apps.
Usability. User perceptions of the usability of 2F is often cor-
related with their individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender,
background), rather than with the actual technology or the
context/motivation in which it is used. We find that, overall,
2F technologies are perceived as highly usable, with little
difference among them, not even when they are used for
different motivations and different contexts. This seems to
contrast with prior work on password policies [15] which
showed that context of use impacts the ability of users to
become familiar with complex passwords and, ultimately,
affects their usability.
One possible explanation, supported by participants’ re-
sponses to open-ended questions, is that most 2F users do
not need to provide the second authentication factor very
often. For instance, some financial institutions (e.g., Chase and
Bank of America) or services provider (such as Google and
Facebook) only require the second factor to be entered if a
user is authenticating from an unrecognized device (e.g., from
a new location or after clearing cookies).
Trustworthiness. Another relevant finding is that users’ per-
ception of trustworthiness is not negatively correlated with
ease of use and required cognitive efforts, somewhat in con-
trast to prior work [6, 13]. We find that 2F technologies
perceived as more trustworthy are not necessarily less usable.
One possible explanation is that prior work mostly compared
2F with passwords.
Impact. We argue that our comparative analysis is essential
to begin assessing attitudes and perceptions of 2F users,
identifying causes of friction, driving user-centered design of
usable 2F technologies, as well as informing future usable
security research. Note that, in many cases, authentication
based on passwords only is actually not an option (e.g., for
corporate VPN access, or for some financial services), and thus
more usable 2F technologies in that context should be favored
to avoid friction [1], negative impact on productivity [15, 26],
as well as driving users to circumvent authentication policies
they perceived as unnecessarily stringent [15]. Similarly, when
users have the choice to opt-in, adoption rates will likely
depend on 2F usability.
Limitations and future work. We acknowledge that our work
presents some limitations and leaves a few items to future
work. First, it is based on a survey of 219 MTurk users, who,
arguably, might be more computer savvy and might adopt 2F
more than the general population. Second, some of the points
raised by our analysis – such as, non-correlation of usability
and context/motivation of use as well as the usability metrics
derived by our factor analysis – should be validated by open-
ended interviews and qualitative studies. Indeed, our current
and future work includes the design of a real-world user study
building on the experience and the findings from this work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented an exploratory comparative study of
two-factor authentication (2F) technologies. First, we reported
on a pre-study interview involving 9 participants, intended to
identify popular 2F technologies as well as how they are used,
when, where, and why. Next, we designed and administered
an online survey to 219 Mechanical Turk users, aiming to
measure the usability of a few popular 2F technologies:
one-time codes generated by security tokens, one-time PINs
received via SMS or email, and dedicated smartphone apps.
We also recorded contexts and motivations, and study their
impact on perceived usability of different 2F technologies.
We considered participants that used specific 2F technologies,
either because they were forced to, or because they wanted to.
We presented an exploratory factor analysis to evaluate a
series of parameters, including some suggested by previous
work, to evaluate the usability of 2F, and show that ease
of use, trustworthiness, and required cognitive effort are the
three key aspects defining 2F usability. Finally, we showed
that differences among the usage of 2F depend on individual
characteristics of people, more than the actual technologies or
contexts of use. We considered a few characteristics, such as
age, gender and computer science background, and obtained
a few insights into user preferences.
Our preliminary study is essential to guide and inform the
design of follow-up qualitative studies, which we plan to
conduct as part of future work.
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